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On November 21, 1991, President George Bush signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 ("the Act").' The President's approval concluded a fierce
two-year debate argued not only in the legislative chambers of Capitol Hill but
also in the media and throughout the country. This debate exposed our nation's
deeply rooted divisions over the issue of race and the meaning of equality. For
civil rights advocates, the passage of the Act achieved their primary objective
of overturning a series of Supreme Court decisions that had drastically limited
the ability of minorities and women to maintain employment discrimination
claims.2 At the same time, President Bush, who had opposed earlier versions
of this legislation, proclaimed satisfaction that the final version of the Act
would not result in racial quotas.3
Although the legislative confrontation was over (at least for the time
being) battles in the courts over the Act's meaning loomed ahead. Of particular
concern was the question of whether or not the Act should apply to cases
pending at the time it was passed or, indeed, to any conduct occurring before
the date of passage. Congress specified that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
2. See Willian T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the Civil Rights Bill Was Really Passed:
The Administration Did Compromise, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A21. Coleman, the chairman of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and Jordan, former president of the National Urban League,
hailed the Act as "a great achievement, both because it significantly strengthens civil rights protections and
because it reestablishes a new political consensus on a subject that has historically divided us." Id. For a
list of Supreme Court decisions reversed by the 1991 Act, see infra notes 61 & 73.
3. During negotiations prior to passage, language was inserted to allay the Administration's concern
that the Act would promote racial quotas. President Bush subsequently announced that he could "certify
it is not a quota bill" and would "enthusiastically" sign the revised bill. White House Announces Civil
Rights Compromise Ending Two-Year Long Dispute, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 208, at A-20
(Oct. 28, 1991). Senator John Danforth of Missouri, one of the bill's principal sponsors, remarked that it
was "conceptually ... the same bill" and that the modifications did not change the substance of the
legislation. Id. Many employers, however, continued to be displeased with the final version of the Civil
Rights Act because of its provisions concerning jury trials, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
Employer Community Displeased with Substitute Civil Rights Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-13
(Oct. 28, 1991).
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would become effective upon enactment.' This statement appears to leave
open four different possibilities. Starting with the most restrictive interpretation
of its applicability, these are: (1) the Act applies only to cases where the
alleged conduct occurred after November 21, 1991; (2) the Act applies to
cases filed after November 21, 1991; (3) the Act applies to all cases tried and
decided after November 21, 1991; and (4) the Act applies to all cases pending
as of November 21, 1991.
5
The final version of the Act contained no general statement choosing
among these possibilities. The primary sponsors of the bill expressed divergent
opinions on the retroactivity issue6 and the congressional debates were replete
with contradictory statements.7 Several circuit courts of appeals have
considered whether the Act should apply retroactively to pending cases, with
most concluding that it should not.8 On February 22, 1993, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve this question.9
4. "Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall
take effect upon enactment." § 402(a), 105 Stat, at 1099, reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 note (West Supp.
1993) (Effective Date of 1991 Amendment).
5. Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases,
90 MICH. L. REv. 2035, 2055 n.139 (1992) (noting three possibilities: (1) application of Act only to cases
where cause of action arose after effective date; (2) application only to cases filed after effective date;
(3) application to all cases pending on effective date); see also Mojica v. Gannett Co., 986 F.2d 1158,
1161-62 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting) (distinguishing cases tried and decided before
November 21, 1991, from cases tried and decided after that date). In discussing the question of
"retroactivity," this Note focuses on the Act's applicability to all cases pending as of November 21, 1991,
which is the question that most courts of appeals have examined thus far. Id. at 1159.
6. Compare 137 CONG. REC. S15,483, S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)(interpretative memorandum
of Sen. Danforth et al.) (opposing retroactivity) with id. at S15,485 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing
that Act should apply to pending cases). President Bush endorsed the statement of Senator Dole and other
senators, id. at S 15472-78, which argued that the Act should not apply retroactively. Statement of President
George Bush upon Signing S1745, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (Nov. 21, 1991).
7. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H9526, H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (interpretative memorandum of
Rep. Edwards) (failing to apply law retroactively would give employers "an undeserved windfall from the
intervening Supreme Court errors"); 137 CONG. REC. S15,493 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Murkowski) ("Retroactivity is fundamentally unfair."); 137 CONG. REc. E2086 (daily ed. June 7, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Doolittle) (retroactivity would be "a serious blow to fundamental notions of fairness").
8. See Butts v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1993)
(provisions revising 42 U.S.C. § 1981 do not apply retroactively); Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d
470 (9th Cir. 1993) (supporting retroactive application); Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d
1370 (11th Cir. 1992) (provisions concerning jury trials and § 1981 do not apply retroactively); Gersman
v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (revisions of § 1981 do not apply retroactively);
Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); Mozee v. American Commercial
Marine Serv., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.) (no retroactive application), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Fray
v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992) (revisions of § 1981 do not apply
retroactively); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.) (no retroactive application to damages
claim), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
9. 122 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1993) (granting certiorari in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427 (5th
Cir. 1992) and Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub nom.
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.). Landgraf involved the provisions of the 1991 Act concerning
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and jury trials. § 102(a)(1), (c), 105 Stat. at 1072-73 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West Supp. 1993)). The Fifth Circuit held that these provisions should not be
applied retroactively. 968 F.2d at 432-33. Harvis involved the provisions of the 1991 Act that overruled
the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), that § 1981 is
not applicable to racial harassment occurring after the formation of an employment contract. § 101(b), 105
Stat. at 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(b) (West Supp. 1993)). The Sixth Circuit held that this
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This Note approaches the retroactivity question from a perspective that has
been neglected by the courts and by other commentators.10 It argues that, in
answering this question, the Court should consider the divisive climate in
which the Civil Rights Act was passed. The debate over the Act exemplifies
the barriers that minority groups can generally expect to confront in protecting
their interests through the legislative process. During the legislative battle,
dialogue in Congress and in the press was dominated by the question of
"quotas." This inflammatory rhetoric polarized the electorate, largely along
racial lines, causing many voters to perceive the Act in "us-versus-them"
terms.
In any analysis, courts must take into account the distorting impact of
racial prejudice." With respect to the interpretation of antidiscrimination
statutes, courts should consider the difficulty that racial minorities are likely
to encounter when attempting to correct judicial interpretations that work to
their disadvantage.' 2 An interpretation of a statute that harms the majority
group may be remedied through subsequent legislative action. By contrast, an
interpretation that works to the disadvantage of "discrete and insular
minorities" will be comparatively difficult to undo through the same legislative
process. Where doubt exists as to the best interpretation of a statute, courts
should resolve these doubts to the benefit of racial minorities.
Part I puts forward a process-based theory of statutory interpretation,
provision of the 1991 Act should not apply retroactively. 973 F.2d at 495-97.
10. For other recent commentary on this question, see David Allen, Comment, Retroactivity of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 569 (1992) (arguing against retroactivity); Estrin, supra note
5 (arguing for retroactivity); Linda Urbanik, Comment, Executive Veto, Congressional Compromise, and
Judicial Confusion: The 1991 Civil Rights Act-Does It Apply Retroactively?, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109
(1992) (arguing that question of retroactivity should be determined on case-by-case basis); Kristine N.
McAlister, Recent Developments, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1319 (1992) (arguing against retroactivity).
I1. My conception of the appropriate role of the judiciary in interpreting and applying
antidiscrimination statutes borrows from the work of John Hart Ely, who advocates a process-based theory
ofjudicial review. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST (1980). As discussed infra Part
I.A., Ely's analysis provides a comprehensive elaboration of the theory of heightened scrutiny first
suggested in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). My analysis also
borrows from the work of Dean Guido Calabresi. See GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES (1982). Calabresi argues that courts should have the power to revise statutes that no longer
fit the "legal topography"-that is, statutes that have become obsolete, but have not been revised by the
legislature. Among the factors that courts should consider in determining whether to revise statutes are
"asymmetries in inertia"--the greater difficulty that some groups will have in obtaining legislative
reconsideration of a judicial decision. Id. at 124-29. As a general rule, Calabresi recommends "putting the
burden of inertia on the side that can more easily obtain majoritarian reconsideration of the allocation." Id.
at 126.
12. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 602 (1992) (noting tendency of Court in late
1970's "to interpret ambiguous statutes to benefit 'discrete and insular minorities"'); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy,
22 U. TOL. L. REv. 583, 645 (1991) (suggesting that courts should consider barriers confronted by
relatively powerless groups when interpreting statutes). This Note subscribes to Stempel's position that
"enacting civil rights legislation is, even more than with most reformist legislation, an uphill fight" and that
the courts should "take this reality into account before assuming that Congress can correct any judicial
misreading of the law." Id. at 669, 671.
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arguing that in cases where a statute is ambiguous on its face, the legislative
history is inconclusive, and minorities are likely to encounter barriers to full
participation in the legislative process, courts should resolve ambiguities in
favor of those minorities. Part II details the "us-versus-them" atmosphere in
which the Act was discussed, exposing the prominent role of prejudice in
congressional and public debates. Because it is precisely under such conditions
that the minority groups are often powerless, Part III argues that the ambiguity
over the Act's retroactivity should be resolved so as to compensate for the
distorting effect of prejudice on the legislative process.
Existing theories of statutory interpretation fail to resolve ambiguities in
statutes governing highly polarized questions like employment discrimination.
Fairness requires that courts take into account the climate in which the
legislation was passed, as well as the obstacles that minority groups can
generally expect to face in overcoming racial prejudice.' 3 Courts should
compensate for disadvantages in bargaining power by construing ambiguous
provisions of antidiscrimination statutes in the light most favorable to racial
minority groups. Under this analysis, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be
applied retroactively.
I. A PROCESS-BASED THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Scholars have long recognized the importance of protecting the rights of
minorities through constitutional adjudication. In the interpretation of
antidiscrimination statutes, it is equally critical that courts consider the
difficulties that racial minority groups experience in protecting themselves
through the legislative process. Existing canons of statutory interpretation
prove inadequate to resolve ambiguities in civil rights statutes that concern the
rights of racial minorities.' 4 Courts should interpret statutory provisions to the
advantage of racial minority groups where: (1) the statute is ambiguous on its
face; (2) the legislative history is inconclusive or contradictory; and (3) the
13. Though I believe that the argument advanced here could be extended to other groups, this Note
focuses on racial minorities. A particularly interesting question is the extent to which the arguments
advanced here are applicable to women. Although the Act concerned employment rights of both women
and minorities, the legislative battle and public debate focused on the question of racial quotas. As argued
infra Part II, the tenor of this debate influenced the legislative process and impeded the ability of minorities
to advance their legislative interests. Despite the fact that the Act strengthened protections against sex
discrimination as well as race discrimination, the public (at least until the final stages of the process) was
polarized along racial lines, perceiving the Act in "us-versus-them" terms. Attention to racial quotas fueled
the public perception that the Act pitted the interests of the white majority against the interests of racial
minority groups. For these reasons, this Note focuses almost exclusively on the burdens racial minorities
confront in reserving adverse Supreme Court decisions.
14. For an entertaining review of traditional canons of statutory interpretation, see John Paul Stevens,
The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373 (1992). Justice Stevens
analyzes the authorship of Shakespeare's plays through five canons of interpretation: (1) read the statutory
provision in question; (2) read the statute as a whole; (3) consider the contemporary legal context;
(4) consult the legislative history; and (5) use common sense to avoid absurd results.
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debate in which the statute was passed was polarized along racial lines or the
present climate is polarized along racial lines.
A. Process-Based Theories of Judicial Review
Process-based theories of judicial review are helpful in understanding the
mode of analysis that courts should adopt when interpreting ambiguous
antidiscrimination statutes. In Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely argues
that prejudice directed at minority groups obstructs their ability to participate
fully in the democratic process.' 5 Ely builds upon Carolene Products' famous
footnote 4 which suggests that more stringent standards of review may be
appropriate in evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that reflect prejudice
against "discrete and insular minorities."' 6 According to Ely, the discreteness
and insularity of minority groups-the fact that they are "marked" and readily
identifiable as minorities-is likely to engender hostility against them. For this
reason, heightened scrutiny is necessary in assessing the constitutionality of
measures that disadvantage such groups.
There is no corresponding need for heightened scrutiny, however, where
a rule works to the disadvantage of the majority group. As Ely puts it:
There is no danger that the coalition that makes up the white majority
in our society is going to deny to whites generally their right to equal
concern and respect. Whites are not going to discriminate against all
whites for reasons of racial prejudice .... Whether or not it is more
blessed to give than to receive, it is surely less suspicious. 7
While there is a risk of majorities acting in ways that harm racial minorities
based on prejudice or animosity, there is no parallel risk that a majority will
harm itself as a group."8 The majority is in a position to protect its own
interests through the political process. Racial minorities, by contrast, may have
a difficult time in doing so. For this reason, courts should pay special attention
to racial classifications that work against minority groups.
15. ELY, supra note 11, at 152-53.
16. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
17. ELY, supra note 11, at 170-71 (footnotes omitted). Although this passage occurs within Ely's
discussion of affirmative action, the reasoning evident here is equally relevant to other rules that work to
the advantage (or disadvantage) of racial minorities.
18. This explains why the Court traditionally has subjected classifications based on nationality and race
to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). The discreteness and insularity of racial minorities may preclude their
full participation in the pluralistic "wheeling and dealing" through which groups typically protect their
interests. ELY, supra note 11, at 151. Heightened scrutiny reflects the Court's concern for groups that are
at a relative disadvantage in their ability to influence the legislative process. See Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (referring to aliens as "prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for
whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate") (citation omitted).
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B. The Implications for Statutory Interpretation
At the end of his book, Ely asserts that "constitutional law appropriately
exists for those situations where representative government cannot be trusted,
not those where we know it can."' 9 Ely's insight-that courts should ensure
the protection of minority groups in the area of constitutional law-may be
applied fruitfully to the interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes. Precisely
because questions of race discrimination and "quotas" touch a raw nerve
among the American public,2" it is vital that courts compensate for
deficiencies in the legislative process when interpreting statutes.
According to Ely, statutory rules that disadvantage white majorities are not
inherently suspicious, since such majorities can adequately protect their
interests through representative government. By the same token, a white
majority would presumably be in a better position than minorities to obtain
legislative reconsideration of statutory interpretations that work to its
disadvantage. It is likely to be much more difficult for racial minorities to
reverse a court's interpretation of a statute through subsequent legislative
action. To borrow Calabresi's phrase, the burden of legislative inertia-the
difficulty with which judicial determinations may be reversed-is greater for
minority groups than for the majority group.2' When interpreting ambiguous
antidiscrimination statutes, courts should compensate for these unequal burdens
by giving minority interests the benefit of the doubt.
1. Precedent for the Theory: Weber and Runyon
Although the Court has never explicitly embraced this theory of statutory
interpretation, the approach suggested here is not entirely unprecedented.
During the 1970's, the Court adopted interpretations of two ambiguous
antidiscrimination statutes that worked to the benefit of racial minorities over
the vigorous protests of dissenting Justices who claimed that the majority had
misconstrued congressional intent."
Section 1981, passed in the wake of the Civil War, gives all persons the
right to make and enforce contracts.23 In Runyon v. McCrary, decided in
19. ELY, supra note 11, at 183.
20. See infra Part II.
21. Calabresi stresses the importance of considering asymmetrical burdens of inertia in connection with
the revision of statutes. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 124-29. Asymmetrical burdens of inertia exist where
one side can more easily obtain legislative reconsideration of a judicial deterlination than the other. See
id. Stempel brings this idea to bear on the interpretation of employment discrimination statutes. Stempel,
supra note 12, at 589. For an empirical analysis of cases reviewed and overriden by Congress, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331 (1991).
22. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976).
23. Prior to its revision, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1981 provided:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
[Vol. 103: 567
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1976, the Court held that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination by private
parties in the making and enforcement of contracts.24 Although the Court did
not expressly consider the disadvantages faced by "discrete and insular
minorities," this decision may be understood as silently applying Carolene
Products presumptions325 The Court adopted a generous reading of § 1981
that ensures the protection of racial minorities against private acts of
discrimination. 6
The Supreme Court's consideration of private affirmative action programs,
in light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, bears a striking
resemblance to the Runyon decision. In United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,27 the Court held that Title VII did not prohibit affirmative action
programs voluntarily adopted by employers. As in Runyon, the Court
interpreted an ambiguous statute to the benefit of minority groups.28 Although
Title VII prohibits discrimination "against any individual because of his
race,"'29 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found the affirmative action
plan in question to be acceptable. °
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). This statute was first adopted in § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress
reenacted the provisions contained in § 1981 subsequent to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-70 n.8.
24. Id. at 170-71. The specific practice at issue in Runyon was a private institution's discriminatory
admissions policy.
25. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 602 & n.28.
26. In a dissenting opinion, Justice White contended that the majority's extension of § 1981 to include
private discrimination was "contrary to the language of the section, to its legislative history, and to the clear
dictum of this Court." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192.
27. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
28. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 602 & n.28. Some commentators have criticized the Weber
court for misreading the legislative history of Title VII. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 303 (1989) (criticizing Weber because it "contradicts both the
plain language and the legislative history of Title VII"); Bernard D. Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial
Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 456 (1980)
(criticizing majority for undercutting legislative bargain). But see Burt Neuborne, Observations on Weber,
54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 546, 553 (1979) (defending Weber on grounds that legislatures generally enact a "broad
philosophical concept-in this case, equality in employment" and cannot foresee many questions that
subsequently arise in applying that principle).
29. Section 703(d) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer [or] labor organization... to
discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1988). Similarly, § 703(a) makes it unlawful for employers to "discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin" Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
30. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist lambasted the majority for ignoring "clear
statutory language, 'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uniform precedent." Id. at 222. Rehnquist
undertook an extended review of the legislative history of Title VII, which in his view conclusively
demonstrated that Congress "meant precisely what it said." Id. -at 230.
For a summary of the legislative process through which the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 2-28 (1988). Although Eskridge agrees with the Weber holding, he
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A comparison of the various opinions in these cases reveals the difficulties
that courts are likely to experience in applying canons of statutory
interpretation to antidiscrimination cases. In Weber and Runyon, various
Justices consulted the text of the statutory provision in question;31 considered
the statute as a whole;32 relied upon precedent;33 placed the statute in
historical context; 34 viewed the statute in light of the "fabric of our law;"35
and examined the statute's legislative history.36 Even Justices applying the
same mode of interpretation arrived at different conclusions.
The disparity among the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
these cases counsels against putting too much stock in traditional canons to
resolve thorny questions surrounding the interpretation of ambiguous
antidiscrimination statutes. The various opinions gave differential weight to
each canon, illustrating the Justices' widely divergent visions of the principles
underlying the legislation in question. While the dissenting Justices in Runyon
saw § 1981 as prohibiting only discrimination by the state, the majority
harbored a much broader vision of the protections afforded by this statute. This
difference is even more pronounced in Weber. For Justice Rehnquist, the
purpose of Title VII is to protect employees against all forms of race-based
employment decisions; for Justice Brennan, the purpose at the heart of Title
VII is to break down historic patterns of discrimination and to open up
opportunities for traditionally subordinated groups. Canons of statutory
interpretation provide few helpful guidelines when these visions clash. The
disputes among the Justices mirror the dispute within society over the meaning
of equality. Collectively, these opinions reveal the necessity of finding some
agrees with Rehnquist's view that the supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 intended to prohibit
affirmative action. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1491 & n.46 (1987); see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections
on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 685, 710 (1991).
31. Compare Weber, 443 U.S. at 204 (asserting that Title VII's language was intended to eliminate
vestiges of discrimination) with id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "clear statutory language"
of Title VII prohibited race-conscious measures).
32. Id. at 208 (concluding that purposes of affirmative action plan "mirror those of the statute," namely
"to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy").
33. Compare Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 n.8 (1976) (arguing that Court's "square
holding" in prior case, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), was "that § 1981 reaches
private conduct") with id. at 192 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's interpretation of § 1981
contradicted "clear dictum of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases").
34. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201 (stating that permissibility of affirmative action program must be
considered in view of "historical context from which [Civil Rights Act of 1964] arose"); Runyon, 427 U.S.
at 204 (White, J., dissenting) (giving § 1981 narrow reading on grounds that it would have been
"remarkable if Congress had intended § 1981 to require private individuals to contract with all persons the
same as they contract with white citizens").
35. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens cites the "prevailing sense of justice
today," id. at 191, as a reason for giving § 1981 broad scope, despite his belief that Congress did not intend
to prohibit private racial discrimination. Id. at 189-90.
36. Compare Weber, 443 U.S. at 203 (asserting that legislative history of Title VII demonstrated that
Congress' overarehing objective was to open up employment opportunities for blacks) with id. at 230-55
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding from comprehensive review of legislative history that Title VII was
intended to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination whether directed at blacks or whites).
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other means by which to resolve ambiguity in antidiscrimination statutes.
Where a statute's language and history are unclear, courts should consider
the problems that minority groups will experience in reversing judicial
interpretations contrary to their interests.37 Such a process-based theory of
statutory interpretation supports the results reached, though not the reasoning
employed, in Runyon and Weber. Decisions that disadvantage racial minorities
would be very difficult to remedy through subsequent legislation. Had either
Runyon or Weber been decided the other way-contrary to the interests of
minority groups-it is unlikely that these determinations would have been
reversed. The burden of inertia would simply be too high for a relatively
powerless group to overcome.
On the other hand, the majority is in a stronger position to remedy a
judicial decision that disadvantages it, because it may more easily obtain
subsequent legislative reconsideration of the decision. The majority can
presumably protect itself-at least better than minority groups can. If members
of the white majority are unduly burdened by affirmative action programs, the
legislature can respond by revising or reversing the court's interpretation.
Of course, decisions that run counter to the interests of the majority will
not always be reversed by Congress. In the private affirmative action cases, for
example, it would be naive to assume that minority groups have no power to
block legislation detrimental to their interests. If a court misreads a statute in
a way that benefits minorities, these groups would surely attempt to prevent
37. The discussion in the text assumes that honest interpretation requires fidelity to the legislature's
intent where that intent has been clearly expressed. See CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 35 (stating that
"legislative intent or language" is the "core of honest interpretation"); REED DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7-9 (1975); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The
Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court,
39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 301 (1990) (asserting that goal of statutory interpretation is to determine
legislature's purpose). For a broader conception of interpretation, see Eskridge, supra note 30, at 1479;
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
Eskridge believes that courts should give effect to contemporary values in interpreting statutes. Like
Calabresi, he favors a dynamic approach to the application of statutes that allows courts to update statutes
that are out of phase with the contemporary legal and social landscape. But unlike Calabresi, he is
comfortable referring to this approach to statutes as a form of interpretation. For a similar view, see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988). Aleinikoff criticizes
"archeological" conceptions of statutory interpretation, in which the statute's meaning is set in stone, and
advocates a "nautical" view of statutory interpretation, which conceptualizes the development of a statute's
meaning as an ongoing process or "voyage."
Calabresi, Eskridge, and Aleinikoff share the view that courts must sometimes go beyond the actual
intent of the enacting legislature and take into account current social or legal norms. For an opposing view,
see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (asserting that judges are merely agents of the political branches
"carryfing] out decisions they do not make"); see also Farber, supra note 28. Farber takes a middle-of-the-
road position, arguing that clear statutory directives should preclude judicial policymaking, while counseling
against "blind adherence" to statutory language. ld. at 282.
This Note tentatively accepts the conclusion that in the interpretation of statutes, courts are bound by
clear expressions of legislative intent. But see infra note 38. Where the legislature's intent is unclear and
courts must go beyond the language of the statute, reliance upon the "legal topography" or upon "social
norms," however, is inadequate. Rather, courts should attempt to correct for inequities in the legislative
process by interpreting statutes to the benefit of relatively powerless groups.
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reversal of the court's decision. Nonetheless, the burden of inertia would be
greater when the court's decision disadvantages a minority group than when
it disadvantages the white majority. Given the uncertainty surrounding the
meaning of § 1981 and Title VII, the Court acted correctly in adopting the
interpretations that protected minority group members.38
2. Process-Based Theory and Stare Decisis: Patterson and Johnson
A related question concerns the circumstances under which legislative
inaction can be construed as approval of a court's interpretation. 39 The same
factors that counsel against interpreting a statute to the disadvantage of a racial
minority also counsel against overturning an interpretation that benefits racial
minorities. Under a process-based theory of judicial interpretation, decisions
that work against minority groups are entitled to less precedential weight than
decisions that disadvantage members of the majority group in deciding whether
to apply stare decisis.
Here again, the Court's interpretations of § 1981 and Title VII are
instructive. The interpretation of § 1981 advanced by the majority in Runyon
was upheld in subsequent decisions, though the Court considered overruling
Runyon in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.40 Patterson reaffirmed that
§ 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the making and
enforcement of private contracts. The majority applied stare decisis, finding
"no special justification" for overruling Runyon.4 t
The Court's decisions upholding Weber are also consistent with the view
that courts should be more willing to adhere to precedents that benefit
minorities. The Court has consistently upheld Weber's interpretation of Title
38. Even where a statute's language and intent are clear, it may be appropriate for courts to revise
antidiscrimination statutes that have become obsolete, such that they fail to provide adequate protection to
members of minority groups. Both Weber and Runyon can be understood as examples of judicial revision,
inasmuch as the Court silently updated statutes while ostensibly discerning legislative intent. Even if one,
believes that § 1981 and Title VII are not ambiguous-that Congress did not intend § 1981 to reach private
acts of discrimination and that Congress did intend Title VII to prohibit voluntary affirmative action
programs-the decisions in these cases may still be supportable as instances of "judicial updating." On this
reading, the lesser power of minority groups justified the Court's deviation from congressional intent.
This idea builds upon Calabresi's notion that courts should be empowered to update statutes that have
become outdated, but have not been revised by the legislature. See generally CALABRESI, supra note II.
The same factors that caution against interpretations of ambiguous antidiscrimination statutes that
disadvantage minority groups are relevant to determining whether and when courts should update civil
rights statutes. If a statute becomes out of phase and fails to provide adequate protections to minority
groups, there is no reason to presume that the statute will be revised by the legislature. Under some
circumstances, it may be appropriate for courts to set a new starting point by openly revising such statutes.
39. For an extended discussion of the debate over the meaning that should be attributed to the
legislature's failure to take action, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 67 (1988).
40. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
41. Id. at 173. Nonetheless, the Court declined to include racial harassment, subsequent to hiring, as
an actionable claim under § 1981, contending that the statute covers only "conduct at the initial formation
of the contract and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract obligations." Id. at 179.
[Vol. 103: 567
The Persistence of Prejudice
VII, permitting private affirmative action programs in "traditionally segregated
job categories. 42 Particularly enlightening is the lively debate between
Justices Brennan and Scalia in Johnson v. Transportation Agencyn3 over the
weight to be given to legislative inaction. Writing for a majority in Johnson,
which upheld Weber,4 Justice Brennan found "some probative value" in
Congress' failure to act in response to the Weber holding.45 In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Scalia disagreed, emphasizing that checks on legislation
"create[] an inertia that makes it impossible to assert with any degree of
assurance that congressional failure to act" represents approval of the Court's
action. In his view, the Court "should admit that vindication by congressional
inaction is a canard. 46 Scalia would give no weight to congressional inaction
in response to the Court's rulings.
While Scalia's insight may be true as a general matter, he fails to
recognize that the majority faces a much lighter burden in attempting to
reverse interpretations that work to its disadvantage. Neither Johnson nor
Patterson considers the crucial fact that the parties that benefitted by Runyon
and Weber were members of racial minority groups. Given that the majority
group is better able to effect reversal of statutory interpretations that work to
its disadvantage, Congress' silence or inaction in response to Weber and
Runyon may properly be seen as a persuasive factor favoring application of
stare decisis.
C. Objections to Process-Based Theories
The argument that ambiguous statutes should be interpreted to the
advantage of racial minorities relies on an assumption that discrete and insular
minorities will have difficulty passing legislation that benefits them and
blocking legislation that works against their interests. But there is reason to
believe that, at least under some circumstances, racial minorities are not as
42. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that employee
challenging affirmative action program bears burden of establishing its illegality under Title VI); Local
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (addressing conditions under
which parties to employment discrimination suit may enter into consent decree containing numerical
quotas); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (remedying past discrimination by state may
justify affirmative action plan).
At least one commentator has suggested that the Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), may have signalled its intention to reject the holding in Weber. Brian K.
Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1267, 1314 (1992); see also Farber & Frickey,
supra note 30, at 720 (suggesting that Weber holding may be questioned in the future).
43. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
44. Id. at 619-20.
45. Brennan quoted Calabresi for the proposition: "When a court says to a legislature: 'You (or your
predecessor) meant X,' it almost invites the legislature to answer: 'We did not."' Id. at 630 n.7 (quoting
CALABRESI, supra note II, at 31-32); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 652 n.221 (1991) ("The Johnson
majority ... explicitly relied on current congressional preferences to expand on Weber.").
46. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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powerless as this Note has to this point supposed.47 If a court revises a
statutory rule to benefit or protect minorities, then those groups are certain to
fight any legislative attempts at change. The preceding discussion, one might
argue, underestimates the clout of racial minority groups.
The view that racial minorities are not, in fact, disadvantaged in the
legislative process bears serious consideration. As Bruce Ackerman argues,
discreteness and insularity may actually work to the advantage of groups
attempting to advance their interests through the legislative process.48
Insularity may "help breed sentiments of group solidarity. '49 Being discrete
allows members to "mark out" and identify one another in ways that other
groups-homosexuals for instance-cannot. Both these characteristics confer
benefits on those attempting to represent their interests in a pluralistic
democracy." All other things being equal, discrete and insular minorities may
be a powerful force in legislative bargaining.
But all things are not necessarily equal. The protection of discrete and
insular minorities through the process of judicial review cannot be understood
without examining the role that prejudice plays in impeding the operations of
normal democratic processes. 2 While recognizing that prejudice may in some
ways work to the disadvantage of racial minorities, Ackerman argues that it
cannot bear the weight that it must bear in the process-based theory of judicial
review expounded by Ely. This theory depends upon legislators and their
constituents perceiving issues in "us-versus-them" terms. Ackerman denies that
this view of human psychology is persuasive. While congressional
representatives may sometimes engage in "all-out appeal[s] to prejudice," they
are more likely to seek alliances with groups who are not their "natural
allies."53
Although this critique is directed towards the Carolene Products theory of
judicial review, it may also be applied to a theory of statutory interpretation
that takes into account the supposed defects in the legislative process. If
blacks, for instance, are on the whole advantaged by their status as a "discrete
47. See KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 317 (1986) (suggesting that interest groups are more successful in blocking legislation that
works to their disadvantage than in passing new legislation that works to their benefit).
48. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985).
49. Id. at 725.
50. Ackerman's analysis builds on the work of Robert A. Dahl. See ROBERT A. DAHI, A PREFACE
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). Dahl argues that "on matters of specific policy the majority rarely rules."
Id. at 124. Racial minority groups, long excluded from the normal political arena, may "nevertheless often
gain entry" as they form a larger part of the electorate and the "normal opportunities of the system become
open to them and further protections of the franchise can then depend more and more upon the use of
checkpoints in the normal system." Id. at 138.
51. Ackerman, supra note 48, at 723-24; see also Eskridge, supra note 39, at 107 (arguing that failure
of Congress to revise Weber is not surprising in view of relative strength of groups favoring Court's
decision).
52. Ackerman, supra note 48, at 731.
53. Id. at 734 n.39.
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and insular minority," then it seems inappropriate to adopt an interpretive bias
that works to their benefit. Indeed, it might make sense to adopt a contrary
presumption and interpret statutes so that they work to the disadvantage of
minority groups.54
As Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey point out in their response to
Ackerman's article, his views do not "match political reality. 55 Ackerman is
correct to emphasize the heavy weight that prejudice must carry in Carolene
Products theories. He is wrong, however, to believe that prejudice cannot meet
this burden. Minority groups do have some clout. But at least on the national
level, "the clout is subordinate to that of the business community unless
minorities succeed in persuading a large number of whites and decisionmaking
elites of the correctness of their cause. 5 6 Particularly when hot-button issues
like job discrimination and affirmative action are at issue, the public is very
likely to be divided along racial lines.
Ely's commentary on constitutional law applies equally to considerations
of statutory interpretation. Just as the constitutionality of distributions cannot
be determined "simply by looking to see who ended up with what,"'57 the
question of what statutory rules adequately protect minorities cannot be
answered merely by investigating "who ended up with what." Rather, courts
must consider defects in the process of legislation-including the greater
burden of inertia that minority groups face.
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
A careful examination of the climate in which the Civil Rights Acts of
1990 and 1991 were debated reveals how prejudice can distort the legislative
process. On the surface, the passage of the 1991 Act seems to cut against the
general view espoused in Part I. After all, minority groups ultimately reversed
the Supreme Court's adverse decisions. Judged from this standpoint, the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 lends support to the position that
discrete and insular minorities, and particularly African Americans, command
enormous power in the legislative process.
While this view may have superficial appeal, it completely ignores the
climate in which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed. The debate
54. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987),
suggests just such an inversion of the Carolene Products presumption. In arguing that an affirmative action
program benefitting women should be overturned, Scalia contends that the Court, in upholding Weber, has
done a disservice to those with the least ability to protect themselves through the legislative process: "The
irony is that these individuals [the men disfavored by the affirmative action program]-predominantly
unknown, unaffluent, unorganized-suffer this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the
champion of the politically impotent." Id. at 677; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 30, at 687 ("Justice
Scalia's argument flips Carolene Products completely .....
55. Farber & Frickey, supra note 30, at 688.
56. Stempel, supra note 12, at 641 n.203.
57. ELY, supra note 11, at 136.
1993]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 567
surrounding both the 1990 and 1991 Acts exemplifies the "us-versus-them"
atmosphere in which the power of minority groups is at its lowest ebb." The
fact that this legislation was enacted does not necessarily mean that its
provisions are adequate to protect minorities from employment discrimination.
The 1991 Act represents the only comprehensive legislative revision of
employment discrimination laws since the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Given
the difficulties that minorities face in getting such legislation passed,
ambiguities in the 1991 Act, including the question of retroactivity, should be
resolved to their benefit.
The rhetorical strategies employed by both proponents and opponents of
the bill shed light on the uphill battle that minorities can generally expect to
face in reversing Supreme Court determinations adverse to their interests. Even
though neither the 1990 nor the 1991 Act contained provisions requiring
employment quotas, the debate surrounding both bills centered on the quota
issue.6' As originally proposed, the 1990 Act aimed to overturn, at least in
part, nine recent Supreme Court decisions unfavorable to civil rights
plaintiffs.6 ' But from the beginning, conservative opponents of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 attempted to portray the bill as one that would require
58. This Note focuses primarily on the debate surrounding the 1991 Civil Rights Act. For a detailed
discussion of the history of the failed 1990 Act, see Stempel, supra note 12, at 645-54; James Forman, Jr.,
Current Topics, Victory By Surrender: The Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 and The Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 10 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 133, 150-65 (1992).
59. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, there were two reversals of Supreme Court decisions adverse
to employment discrimination plaintiffs. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 permits
plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees from defendants. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified
at42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981)). This Act overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act overturned the
Court's holding in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The 1978 amendment to Title VII
provided that discrimination against pregnant women violated Title VII. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
60. The debate centered on whether the reformulation of the burdens of proof in disparate impact cases
would effectively require employers to adopt racial quotas. See Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act
of 1991: What Does It Mean and What Is Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304, 313-14 (1992). The
final version of this provision appears at § 105 of the Act. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074-76 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West Supp. 1992)). This section reverses the Court's decision in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and reinstates the "business necessity" test originally
adopted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat.
1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992)).
61. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (restricting recovery of
attorney's fees against intervenors); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (§ 1981 does
not apply to racial harassment subsequent to hiring); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989) (time limit for challenging seniority systems begins to run when plan is adopted); Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989) (white firefighters may attack consent decree issued several years earlier); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (employer need not show that employment practice was
essential to prevail in disparate impact case); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (employer
can escape liability in "mixed-motive" case if it can show that same action would have been taken absent
discriminatory motive); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (prevailing parties
not entitled to expert witness fees); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986) (federal employees
not entitled to all remedies available under Title VII); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (upholding
settlement agreement in which counsel for class of plaintiffs was coerced into withdrawing claim for
attorney's fees as part of settlement).
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employers to hire a certain number of minorities or women. This
characterization reflected a strategic decision. As one conservative stated: "If
the issue is drawn as quotas, we win .... If the issue is drawn as civil rights,
we lose."'62 And the strategy appeared to work. In May 1990, Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh advised President Bush to veto the Act, arguing
that it would introduce "surreptitious quotas., 63 Senator John Danforth, the
bill's principal Republican sponsor, vigorously denied this interpretation,
asserting that "quotas will not be the unintended result of this bill."
64
The debate over the 1990 Act also exposed white voters deep-seated
resentment against affirmative action programs. Polls showed that voters were
divided along racial lines on issues of employment discrimination, racial
quotas, and government assistance for blacks.65 At least one Democratic
strategist believed it was "in the best interests of the Democrats to have Bush
sign this bill" in order to prevent the Republicans from "playing the race
card., 66 Although the bill was revised in order to defuse the quota issue,
President Bush maintained that its offending provisions had not been
repaired67 and he vetoed it on October 22, 1990. The attempt to override the
President's veto failed by one vote in the Senate.68
Meanwhile, Republican candidates were parlaying their opposition to the
1990 Civil Rights Act into electoral success. At the beginning of a campaign
trip on behalf of Republican candidates, President Bush asserted that the
vetoed 1990 Act would have resulted in quotas. 69 In North Carolina, Senator
Jesse Helms won a tight race against Democratic challenger Harvey Gantt, an
African American. Though behind in the polls until the final days, Helms
turned the race around through the use of intensely negative advertising,
accusing Gantt of supporting racial quotas.70 One television advertisement
62. Fred Barnes, Veto-ready, NEw REPUBLIC, June 11, 1990, at 12, 13 (quoting Patrick McGuigan of
Free Congress Center for Law and Democracy).
63. R.W. Apple, Jr., Tiptoeing, Bush Comes to a Fork on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1990,
at A20.
64. Steven A. Holmes, Lawmakers Seek a Rights Bill Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1990, at D16.
65. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Civil Rights Bill May Hold Pitfalls for Democrats: Strong Feelings
About Affirmative Action Programs Divide Voters Along Racial Lines, WASH. POsT, July 23, 1990, at A5
("Polls show blacks and whites are severely divided on the questions of quotas, preferential hiring and
special government intervention in behalf of blacks."); Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Race Remains
a Factor in U.S. Politics, 22 NAT'L J. 1621 (1990) (noting "growing antagonism towards blacks among
younger white voter"); Ethan Bronner, High Court's Split on Affirmative Action Echoes Nation's Division,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 1990, at 1, 9 (citing Harris poll indicating that 70% of whites, but only 40% of
blacks, believe blacks receive equal pay for equal work).
66. Edsall, supra note 65 (quoting Robert Beckel, manager of Walter Mondale's 1984 presidential
campaign).
67. See Forman, supra note 58, at 167 (describing affirmative steps taken in response to objection that
bill would promote quotas).
68. Neil A. Lewis, President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives by I Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1990,
at Al.
69. Fred Barnes, Quota, Unquota, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 1990, at 10, 1].
70. Peter Applebome, Helms Kindled Anger in Campaign, and May Have Set Tone for Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B3.
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showed white hands crumpling up a job rejection letter. The narrator's voice
spoke: "You needed that job and you were the best qualified, but they had to
give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?"71 In
Louisiana, Republican gubernatorial candidate David Duke, a former member
of the Ku Klux Klan, who based his campaign in large part on opposition to
affirmative action, won forty-four percent of the vote. Running against the Act
was not a purely Southern phenomenon. In California, Senator Pete Wilson,
who had voted against the Act, used the quota issue in his successful
gubernatorial campaign against Diane Feinstein.72
Against this highly polarized backdrop, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was
introduced in the House on January 3, 1991.7' Republicans believed the issue
of race, brought to the fore by the Act, "offer[ed] the potential of polarizing
the electorate along lines favorable to the GOP."74 Democratic pollster
Stanley Greenberg agreed, seeing the issue as "not only explosive" but
"dangerous" for Democrats. 75 A study commissioned by the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights revealed that "many white voters believe[d] there
[was] pervasive reverse discrimination in the workplace. 76
Democrats immediately attempted to broaden the appeal of the bill by
characterizing it as a measure designed to protect the rights of women in the
workplace. In an interesting attempt to turn the Bush Administration's strategy
on its head, Representative Jack Brooks of Texas, one of the bill's sponsors,
also played the race card, stating: "We need to extend to white women the
right to protect themselves in the workplace, just as black women have had
that right for years. 7 7 Playing upon "us-versus-them" sentiment among white
voters, Brooks' remark suggests that the Act would actually put an end to
reverse discrimination against white women. The attempt to frame the bill as
a women's rights issue continued in the House Education Committee, which
71. MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: Rights or Wrongs; Gergen and Shields (PBS television broadcast,
May 31, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File, Friday Transcript #4045.
72. The narration in one Wilson commercial read: 'Diane Feinstein has promised as governor to fill
state jobs on the basis of strict numerical quotas. Not experience, not qualifications, not ability ... but
quotas .... Susan Yoachum, New Wilson Ad Hammers at "Quotas," S.F. CHRON., July 18, 1990, at AS.
73. See 137 CONG. REC. E33 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 contained provisions overturning the same decisions that would have been reversed by the
1990 Act. See supra note 61. In addition, the 1991 Act reversed the Supreme Court's decisions in EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), in which American citizens in foreign countries were
held not protected by U.S. civil rights laws; West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83 (1991), which held expert witness fees not recoverable by the prevailing plaintiffs; and Marek v.
Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), which disallowed attorney's fees for time worked after the rejection of a
settlement offer, where the amount ultimately awarded was less than the amount originally offered.
74. Thomas B. Edsall, Quotas: Tempting Issue for GOP in '92; Strategists See Opportunity to Exploit
Conflicts Among Democrats, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1991, at Al.
75. Id.
76. Thomas B. Edsall, Rights Drive Said to Lose Underpinnings: Focus Groups Indicate Middle Class
Sees Movement as Too Narrow, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1991, at A6.
77. Steven A. Holmes, New Battle Looming as Democrats Reintroduce Civil Rights Measure, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1991, at A12.
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voted to rename the "Civil Rights Act of 1991" the "Civil Rights and
Women's Equality in Employment Act of 1991. "78
Opponents of the bill were quick to charge that the legislation, like the
1990 Act, would necessitate racial quotas.79 Proponents denied that the bill
would have any such effects. 0 Although there seemed to be general
agreement that a contentious and divisive atmosphere existed, each side
claimed that the other was responsible."' Senator Bill Bradley compared the
Bush Administration's rhetoric to its use of Willie Horton during the 1988
campaign, arguing that Bush was "using race to get votes in a divisive
way.'" Likewise, House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt accused President
Bush of "attempting to exploit working people's fear of losing their jobs in
order to justify pitting white working people against black working people."83
On the other side, the conservative National Congressional Club ran
commercials accusing Senator Kennedy and other liberals of trying to "require
that hiring decisions be based on race."'  In June 1991, President Bush
blasted supporters of the Act as "Beltway-interest groups" and denounced the
"quota bill" that Democrats had proposed. 5 Republican analysts saw the
quota issue as defining the difference between Republicans and Democrats,
78. Richard L. Berke, Partisan Fights Erupt on Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1991, at A22; see
also Forman, supra note 58, at 167; William Raspberry, Why Civil Rights Isn't Selling, WASH. POST, Mar.
13, 1991, at A17 (noting that advocates of Act were trying to sell it not as a bill for blacks, but as "a bill
for the disabled, for working people and, oh yes, of course, for women").
79. The question was whether reformulation of the burdens of proof would force employers to adopt
racial quotas. See 137 CONG. REc. E2086 (daily ed. June 7, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Doolittle); 137 CONG.
REC. H3725 (daily ed. May 30, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Fawell); 137 CONG. REC. E925 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
1991) (remarks of Rep. Crane); id. at S3173 (remarks of Sen. Dole). On February 21, 1991, Senator Alan
Simpson introduced a competing bill which he contended would not result in racial quotas. 137 CONG. REc.
S2136 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Simpson).
80. 137 CONG. REC. E14 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Brooks); 137 CONG. REC. S12,123
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum). For a more comprehensive account of this debate,
see Forman, supra note 58, at 152-60, 165-70. Forman criticizes the civil rights lobby for denying that the
Act would produce quotas, arguing that the strategy followed "undermined the vision underlying the
legislative proposals." Id. at 170. My analysis, on the other hand, suggests that the polarized climate created
by the "quota" charge left proponents with little choice. Portraying the Act as a measure that would benefit
all Americans, rather than one that would benefit racial minorities at the expense of white workers, was
essential to securing its passage.
81. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S2136, S2137 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Simpson)
(stating that 1990 debate had become "a highly charged exercise in partisan politics" that left him "quite
disappointed and even a bit disgusted"); 137 CONG. REC. H2474 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) (remarks of Rep.
Hoyer) (claiming that the Bush Administration, by raising the "specter of quotas," had begun a "self-
serving, deceitful, and contemptible effort to, once again, use racial fears in our country for political ends").
82. James Risen, Bush's Record on Civil Rights, Racial Issues Criticized, L.A. TMES, July 29, 1991,
at A4.
83. Michael K. Frisby, Democrats Set New Strategy: Aim at Bush, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 1991,
at 3. Speaker of the House Thomas Foley alleged that the President's quota rhetoric was creating divisions.
Rep. Charles Wilson of Texas was more blunt, stating that the Act "is never going to become law, so the
voters will never get a chance to see how it works. So they will believe all this scare crap." Scott Shepard,
Bush Dominates Debate, Gains Upper Hand on Rights Bill, ATLANTA J. & CONT., June 6, 1991, at 8.
84. Linda P. Campbell, Groups Unleash Lobbying Blitz on Rights Bill, CHL TRIB., May 27, 1991, § 1,
at 2.
85. Jessica Lee, Campaign Style, Bush Attacks Rights Bill, USA TODAY, June 4, 1991, at 4A.
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"one that could help [President Bush] lift GOP candidates. 86
An equally fierce battle emerged within the media. Dick Williams of the
Atlanta Journal and Constitution sided with Bush's view that the 1991 Act
stressed the "politics of division" and would effectively legalize racial
quotas.87 Jim Fain of the same paper argued that Republicans were employing
racist rhetoric in an attempt to attract the votes of middle-class whites.88 A
New York Times editorial chastised Bush and other Republicans for their
continuing insistence that the Act would promote racial quotas, stating there
was "no more incendiary epithet in present public discourse."89
Although the bill adopted by House Democrats explicitly prohibited race-
based quotas,90 the Administration's strategy appeared to be working. David
Gergen remarked that Bush's rhetoric was aimed to exploit the "drift of white
voters away from the Democratic Party, particularly white males, and this bill
is in part being used as a way to lock those people in."9' The cry of quotas,
according to Gergen, played upon the "backlash in this country among
whites."
92
Polls validated Gergen's assertion of a backlash, particularly with respect
to white males. An ABC News/Washington Post poll revealed that eighty-eight
percent of whites opposed minority preferences to redress past wrongs.93 A
nationwide poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times found "deep
disagreements" between black and white Americans over the question of
antidiscrimination laws.94 Sixty percent of whites believed that "blacks had
an equal or better chance than whites to get good jobs and education."95 By
contrast, sixty-seven percent of black Americans believed that they had fewer
opportunities than white Americans. 96 The Los Angeles Times poll concluded
that white opposition to affirmative action policies that "gave minorities
86. Id.
87. Dick Williams, Bush Speaks the Truth; the Left Engages in Fiction, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June
8, 1991, at A19; see also Ducking the Quota Issue Again, WASH. TIES, Sept. 14, 1991, at D2.
88. Jim Fain, GOP Readies Racist Pitch for 1992 Vote, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 24, 1991, at A15.
89. Tossing Around the 'Quota' Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, § 4, at 18.
90. 137 CONG. REc. H3924 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) ("Nothing in the amendments made by this Act
shall be construed ... to require, encourage, or permit an employer to adopt hiring or promotion
quotas ... ").
91. MacNeiL/Lehrer News Hour, supra note 71. Milton Morris of the Joint Center for Political and
Economic Studies similarly observed that the "Democratic Party is permanently handicapped by its civil
rights role." Steven A. Holmes, Must Democrats Shift Signals on Blacks to Win the Presidency?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, § 4, at 3.
92. MacNeillLehrer News Hour, supra note 71; see also Larry Tye, Quota Issue Sizzles, Touches
Nerve, BOSTON GLOBE, June 9, 1991, at 1, 16 (citing interviews indicating that "the Bush Administration's
framing of civil rights and hiring issues in terms of racial quotas has touched a nerve and aroused American
fears in a way few other issues can").
93. Tom Kenworthy & Thomas B. Edsall, Whites See Jobs on Line in Debate, WASH. POST, June 4,
1991, at Al, A4.
94. Ronald Brownstein, The Times Poll: Black, White Americans Split Over Anti-Bias Laws, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at Al.
95. Id. at A20.
96. Id.
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preference in employment" was hardening.97 Kerry Scanlon of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund noted that, in view of this divisive atmosphere, many
Southern Democrats were "scared to death" of being forced to take a stand on
civil rights in an election year.98
In June 1991, the House passed the Civil Rights Act by a substantial
margin, though not enough to sustain a presidential veto.99 White House Press
Secretary Marlin Fitzwater reiterated the President's intention to veto the Act:
"The [P]resident said that if you don't like it being called a quota bill, change
the bill."'" In the fall, however, the tide began to turn. The Clarence
Thomas/Anita Hill hearings focused attention on sexual harassment. Senator
Paul Simon remarked that during the vote on the Thomas nomination a
Republican Senator said to him, "This will pass the civil rights bill."'0 ' Judy
Mann of the Washington Post argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gave
the Senate the "opportunity to put their votes where their mouths were" by
demonstrating their opposition to sexual harassment.1
0 2
Pressured into taking a stand on sexual harassment, Republican Senators
approached President Bush in October to forge a compromise. Recasting the
debate in terms of sexual harassment rather than racial justice, Congress and
the President moved closer to an agreement.'0 3 Senator Tim Wirth remarked
that the President's change of heart was largely due to the backlash from the
Thomas hearings.'04 In late October, Bush agreed to a compromise bill,
negotiated among Republican Senators, and on November 21, 1991, the
President signed the Civil Rights Act.
97. Id. at A21; see also Susan Schulman & Harold McNeil, Affirmative Action Spawns a White
Backlash, BUFFALO NEws, Nov. 30, 1992, at I (noting increased white resistance to affirmative action
programs).
98. Holmes, supra note 91.
99. Adam Clymer, Rights Bill Passes in House But Vote Is Not Veto-Proof, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1991,
at Al.
100. Frank J. Murray, Quotas: No War, No Truce-Bush, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at Al.
101. Mitchell Locin, Senate's Frayed Image May Help Rights Bill, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1991, § 1, at
12.
102. Judy Mann, Time To Act on Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1991, at D3.
103. See Forman, supra note 58, at 169; Loudon, supra note 60, at 307 ("jT]he Clarence Thomas
confirmation hearings proved to be the final impetus for passage of this new law.").
104. White House Announces Civil Rights Compromise Ending Two-Year Long Dispute, supra note
3. An additional impetus was the strong showing by David Duke in the Republican primary. A New York
Times editorial compared the "coded racist appeals" of Duke and Bush, opining that Duke's success scared
the President into abandoning his "relentless quota bashing." Running for President: Hate and Fear, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at A32; see also Forman, supra note 58, at 170-73 (analyzing connection between
HilliThomas hearings, Duke campaign, and Act's passage). But see C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won,
They Capitulated, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1991, at A23. White House Counsel Gray asserted that the
President's actions were unrelated to the Thomas/Hill hearings and the Duke campaign. According to Gray,
Senator Kennedy had capitulated on the issue of quotas. William Coleman and Vernon Jordan criticized
Gray's attempt to destroy the consensus surrounding the Act, stating that the final version met virtually all
the objectives of the Act's proponents. Coleman & Jordan, supra note 2.
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I. MAKING SENSE OF THE PRODUCT: THE RETROACTmTY QUESTION
The racially divisive atmosphere that produced the Civil Rights Act of
1991 provides a potent example of the continuing relevance of the Carolene
Products presumptions. Throughout the battle over the Act and the 1992
presidential campaign that followed, the issue of civil rights was portrayed by
many politicians and understood by many Americans in "us-versus-them"
terms.' 5 Only when attention was diverted from the question of race toward
the question of sexual harassment was a compromise successfully forged. In
fact, the retroactivity issue appears to have been left intentionally ambiguous
because of congressional reluctance to fight this battle along racial lines. It is
critical then for the Court to consider the racial animus that infected the
legislative process when assessing the retroactivity question.
A. Traditional Sources of Interpretation
Section 402(a) of the 1991 Act states: "Except as otherwise specifically
provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon
enactment."'0 6 Two provisions specifically state that the Act is not to be
applied retroactively to particular classes of cases. First, section 402(b) states:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall
apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before
March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October
30, 1983." 07 Its sole effect is to prevent the Act's provisions overruling the
holding in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio'0 8 from being applied to that
specific case.0 9 Second, the Act specifically provides that section 109, which
extends the protections of Title VII to American citizens working for American
companies overseas, should only apply prospectively: "The Amendments made
by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the
date of the enactment of this Act.""0
The Act does not explicitly state whether or not it should otherwise apply
to conduct occurring before or to cases pending as of the date of its enactment.
Courts have sharply differed in their approach to resolving this issue. While
105. See Thomas B. Edsall, The 'Values' Debate: Us v. Them?; At Issue Is Which Party Best
Represents Heavily White Middle Class, WASH. PosT, July 31, 1992, at A8 (observing "class and racial
appeals designed to shape competing partisan perceptions of 'us' and 'them.' in 1992 presidential
campaign).
106. 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 note (West Supp. 1993) (Effective
Date of 1991 Amendment).
107. Id.
108. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
109. See Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1993).
110. 105 Stat. at 1078, reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e note (West Supp. 1993) (Effective Date of
1991 Amendment)). Section 109 overrules EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
See Reynolds, 985 F.2d at 473-74.
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the majority of appellate courts have held that the Act should not be given
retroactive effect, the rationale for the holdings differs dramatically."'
The debate in the courts has centered on which of two competing lines
of Supreme Court cases should be followed." 2 One line of cases, represented
by Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,' 3 presumes that a court should
apply the law in effect at the time it makes its decision. The other line of
cases, represented by Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,'4 presumes
that a statute is prospective only, unless it contains an explicit statement to the
contrary.
Bradley was a school desegregation suit brought by African-American
parents and guardians in Richmond, Virginia. During the course of litigation,
the school board conceded that the desegregation plan under which it had been
operating was unconstitutional. Subsequent to this admission, Congress enacted
section 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972,11 granting courts the
authority to award attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs upon entry of a final
order. The Court held that section 718 could be applied to attorney's services
that were rendered before the provision was enacted, stating: "We anchor our
holding in this case on the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect
at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the
contrary."" 16
The Bradley Court went on to qualify this statement by setting out three
factors that might suggest that a "manifest injustice" would be done by
applying the statute in question retroactively. First, courts should consider the
nature and identity of the parties. Retroactivity should not be presumed in
matters of merely private concern. " 7 Second, courts should consider the
I 11. For a list of decisions by courts of appeals, see supra note 8. These cases are discussed infra
notes 135-150 and accompanying text. District courts have split on the issue of retroactivity. For decisions
upholding retroactivity, see, e.g., Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Stender
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.
II1. 1991). For courts opposing retroactive application of the Act, see, e.g., Burchfield v. Derwinski, 782
F. Supp. 532 (D. Colo. 1992); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992).
112. These two lines of cases have received extensive treatment elsewhere. For more detailed analysis
of this conflict, see Allen, supra note 10, at 578-90; Estrin, supra note 5, at 2038-43; Urbanik, supra note
10, at 116-24; McAlister, supra note 10, at 1322-33.
113. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
114. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1988).
116. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711. The Court traced the roots of this principle to United States v. The
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801), in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to inquire whether
a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if, subsequent to the judgment, and before
the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which
governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied.
Id. at 110, quoted (with spelling and punctuation changes) in 416 U.S. at 711-12.
117. 416 U.S. at 717-19. The Court cited Chief Justice Marshall's declaration in The Schooner Peggy
that courts should decide matters involving "great national concems" according to existing laws. 416 U.S.
at 719 (quoting 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 110). This statement suggests that not merely the identity of the
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nature of rights affected, hesitating to apply rules retroactively if they would
"infringe upon or deprive a person of a right that had matured or become
unconditional.".. 8 Third, courts should consider the impact of retroactivity
on existing rights. An "increased burden" or "change in the substantive
obligation" weighs against retroactivity." 9
Bowen concerned regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services limiting Medicare reimbursements. A unanimous Court denied
the Secretary's authority to apply those regulations retroactively. In reaching
its conclusion, the Court stated that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law"
and, consequently, that "congressional enactments and administrative rules will
not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result."'120 The Court did not cite Bradley in its opinion but relied on a line
of cases that had not been mentioned or overruled by Bradley.' As the D.C.
Circuit stated in Gersman v. Group Health Association, "the two presumptions
continue to exist in apparent inconsistency."' 22 In Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,23 the Court recognized the conflict between
these two lines of precedent but did not resolve the issue because "under either
view, where the congressional intent is clear, it governs."t 24
The legislative history of the Act offers little guidance, with opinions about
the issue of retroactivity divided along party lines. The original version of the
1990 Civil Rights Act provided that all provisions would apply
retroactively."z In vetoing this bill, President Bush cited its "unfair
retroactivity rules" as one of his reasons.1 26 The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
as originally introduced, contained virtually the same retroactivity provision as
parties, but the significance of the issue at hand should bear upon the question of whether a statute should
be given retroactive effect.
118. Id. at 720.
119. Id. at 721.
120. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
121. Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); Claridge Apts. Co. v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 141,
164 (1944); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935); United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
276 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1928).
122. 975 F.2d 886, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
123. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
124. Id. at 837. Justice White expressed the view that the conflict between Bradley and Bowen is
"more apparent than real," since Bonjorno did not involve "true retroaction, in the sense of the application
of a change in law to overturn a judicial adjudication of rights that had already become final." Id. at 864
(White, J., dissenting). White went on to embrace the Bradley presumption "in favor of application of new
laws to pending cases," essentially abandoning the Bowen presumption against retroactivity. Id. at 866.
Justice Scalia joined the majority's opinion, but wrote separately to address the conflict between Bradley
and Bowen, two cases that he claimed were in "irreconcilable contradiction." Id. at 841 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Scalia argued that the Bradley court had misinterpreted The Schooner Peggy, id. at 848-50,
and reaffirmed the Bowen presumption: "A statute is deemed to be effective only for the future unless
contrary intent appears." Id. at 858.
125. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. S9968 (daily ed. July
18, 1990). The 1990 Act would have applied various provisions to cases pending during May and June
1989, the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
126. 136 CONG. REc. S16,562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (veto message of President Bush).
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the 1990 Act.27 The compromise bill drafted during the summer of 1991
deleted the retroactivity provision but inserted no provision stating that the Act
was prospective only." 8 Congress rejected an attempt by the White House
and Republican legislators to make the Act explicitly prospective only.t29
The bill's principal sponsors, as noted above, disagreed on the question of
retroactivity. Senator Danforth relied on Justice Scalia's opinion in Bonjorno,
expressing the view that in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary
statutes should not be applied retroactively.' 30 Senator Kennedy relied on the
Court's opinion in Bradley, asserting that the Act should apply
retroactively.' 3' Similar debates occurred in the House of Representatives,
with Democratic and Republican members advancing opposing views. 32 In
his signing statement, President Bush sided with the opponents of retroactivity,
stating that Senator Dole's interpretive memorandum "will be treated as
authoritative interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch.' 33
In a floor statement shortly before the Act's passage, Senator Danforth
suggested that courts "take with a large grain of salt floor debate and
statements placed into the Congressional Record which purport to create an
interpretation for the legislation that is before US.' ' 13 4 For the most part,
appellate courts have heeded Senator Danforth's advice and have ignored
statements by members of Congress advocating or rejecting retroactivity.' 35
In Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co.,136 however, the Eighth Circuit found
127. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. H3924-25, H3936 (daily ed.
June 5, 1991).
128. S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S15,503-12 (daily ed. Oct.
30, 1991).
129. See 137 CONG. REC. H3898 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (prospective-only proposal of Rep. Michel).
130. 137 CONG. REC. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
131. Id. at S 15,485 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
132. Compare 137 CONG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Edwards (D-Cal.))
(Act should apply to pending cases) with id. at H9548 (remarks of Rep. Hyde (R-Ill.)) (Act should not
apply to conduct occurring before effective date).
133. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (Nov. 25, 1991). Shortly after the passage, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission announced that it would not seek damages for any conduct occurring before the
effective date of the Act. EEOC Policy Guidance on Retroactivity of Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at D-I (Jan. 2, 1992). The EEOC reversed its position in April 1993, declaring that it
would thereafter interpret the Act to apply retroactively. EEOC Changes Retroactivity View Regarding 1991
Civil Rights Act, 61 U.S.L.W. 2593 (Apr. 6, 1993); EEOC Reiterates Vote to Change Policy on
Retroactivity of 1991 Civil Rights Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at A-I (Apr. 15, 1993). On April
30, 1993, the Department of Justice and EEOC filed a joint anicus brief arguing in favor of retroactivity.
U.S. Supreme Court Brief Filed by Federal Government in Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 84, at D-24 (May 4, 1993).
134. 137 CONG. REC. S 15,325 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth). For a similar
perspective on legislative history, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 861-62 (1992) (where legislative history is confusing and contradictory,
courts should not attempt to use it as guide); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (reviewing
legislative history is "like looking over a crowd and picking out your friends") (quoting conversation with
Harold Leventhal).
135. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
136. 960 F.2d 1370, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992).
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the President's rejection of the 1990 Act's retroactivity provision, in
conjunction with the subsequent deletion of this provision from the 1991 Act,
to be meaningful. The court interpreted the deletion of this provision to
indicate that the legislators supporting retroactivity had implicitly
acknowledged that the Act would only apply prospectively. In the court's view,
the legislative history conclusively prohibited retroactive application under
either the Bradley or Bowen presumptions. 137 "[A]ny other conclusion," the
court stated, "simply ignores the realities of the legislative process."' 38 But
as the Second Circuit has pointed out, the Fray court ignored Congress'
rejection of the Bush Administration's attempts to introduce language that
would have made the Act prospective only. 39 In Fray, the court is equally
guilty of ignoring "the realities of the legislative process."
Finding the legislative history and statutory language unhelpful, most
appellate courts have struggled to come to grips with the Bradley/Bowen
dilemma. While rejecting the Fray court's argument based on legislative
history, the Second Circuit in Butts v. City of New York Department of
Housing Preservation & Development decided against retroactivity. Citing the
maxim that new rules by judges apply retroactively while new statutes apply
only prospectively, 40 the court adopted Bowen's presumption against
retroactivity.141 The Fifth Circuit likewise chose the Bowen presumption
against retroactivity, citing its "lengthy pedigree reflecting obvious and
fundamental concerns of fairness and predictability."' 42 The Sixth Circuit
argued that Bradley should be read narrowly, and that a presumption against
retroactivity should apply wherever "substantive rights and liabilities" are at
issue. 43 In Gersman, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the greater weight of
authority suggested that courts should abide by the Bowen presumption."
Only the Ninth Circuit has held that the Act should be given retroactive
application. In Reynolds v. Martin145 and Davis v. City of San Francisco,146
the court declined to reach the question of whether the Bowen or Bradley
presumption should apply. Both the Reynolds and Davis panels adopted the
rule of statutory construction that no provision should be construed so as to
137. Id. at 1378.
138. Id. In Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit,
determined that the Act should not apply retroactively, regardless of whether the Bradley presumption or
the Bowen presumption was adopted. 976 F.2d 1370 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
139. Butts v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993).
140. Id. at 1410.
141. Id. at 1411.
142. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). For similar
arguments, see Allen, supra note 10, at 569; McAlister, supra note 10, at 1319.
143. Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 597-98 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Mozee v. American
Commercial Marine Serv., 963 F.2d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 1992) (Bradley should apply only when retroactive
application would not infringe on vested rights).
144. 975 F.2d at 897.
145. 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1993).
146. 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).
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make any other provision inoperative. Making note of the two provisions
providing for prospective application only, the Ninth Circuit inferred that the
other parts of the Act should be given retroactive application. But as several
other circuits have pointed out, these provisions could equally be read as
".insurance policies' against the possibility that a court would deem the entire
Act to apply retroactively."' 47
Somewhat more compelling arguments in favor of retroactivity have been
offered in dissenting opinions by Chief Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit and by
Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit. Dissenting in Gersman, Judge Wald
followed the Bradley presumption, arguing that courts should interpret the law
in effect at the time of decision "unless Congress would not intend the
retroactive application of the new law because that would work an
unfairness."'48 In analyzing the question of fairness in this case, Judge Wald
concluded that reasonable expectations would not in fact be frustrated, since
the 1991 Act primarily restored rights existing before adverse Supreme Court
decisions. 4 9 Similarly, in Fray, Judge Heaney engaged in a fairness analysis,
concluding that retroactive application "best serves the interests of fairness by
restoring the rights of parties as they were when [the plaintiff] began her
lawsuit."' 50
B. A Process-Based View of the Retroactivity Question
It is clear then that traditional methods of statutory interpretation provide
little assistance in determining whether the 1991 Act should apply
retroactively. The statutory language makes no clear statement and the Act's
history shows that proposals to make the Act explicitly prospective and
explicitly retroactive were both rejected. As the Second Circuit concluded,
courts are faced with a "deliberately ambiguous" statute., Given the
conflicting presumptions of the Bowen and Bradley decisions, lower courts
have been left with confusing precedent to guide them. Considerations of
"fairness" seem to point courts in both directions.
With the exception of Fray, none of the courts has considered the effect
of the legislative process upon the Act that was eventually approved.'52 None
of the decisions, including Fray, considered the impact that the "us-versus-
147. Butts, 990 F.2d at 1407 (citing Gersman, 975 F.2d at 889-90; Johnson, 965 F.2d at 1372-73;
Mozee, 963 F.2d at 933).
148. Gersman, 975 F.2d at 902.
149. Id. at 907-08.
150. Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1382 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
151. Butts, 990 F.2d at 1406.
152. It is noteworthy that in an en bane decision subsequent to Fray, the Eighth Circuit did not follow
the Fray panel's reasoning. Hicks v. Brown Group, 982 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1992). The Hicks court based
its decision against retroactivity on a preference for the Bowen rule, not on its view of the legislative
process.
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them" attitude pervading the debate had on the Act. Nor have the courts
considered the increased difficulty that minority groups face in reversing
statutory interpretations that work to their disadvantage.
These considerations militate in favor of giving retroactive application to
the 1991 Act. One argument for retroactivity relies upon the asymmetrical
burdens of legislative inertia, discussed in the context of Weber and
Runyon. 53 As in the § 1981 and Title VII cases, the minority groups that
would be disadvantaged by a determination against retroactivity would have
a more difficult time correcting the Court's interpretation. As the 1990 and
1991 debates show, an "us-versus-them" attitude is likely to dominate
whenever the legislature considers race-related questions. 54 By contrast, if
the Court determines that the Act should be given retroactive application,
employers opposed to retroactivity probably would have an easier time
reversing this interpretation of the Act.
There are, however, at least two objections that might be raised to this
argument. For one thing, the remarks of legislators, and particularly those of
Senators Danforth and Kennedy, indicate that Congress had concluded its
deliberations and was leaving the retroactivity issue for courts to decide. These
remarks suggest that the Court's determination, whatever it is, is unlikely to
be reversed by Congress. While this presumption may be true, it is by no
means certain that Congress will not change its mind and reverse the Court.
All other things being equal, the Court should err on the side of protecting the
group with less power in the legislative process.
A second objection strikes closer to the heart of the process-based theory
expounded in this Note. It argues that an interpretive bias in favor of the less
153. See supra Part I.
154. The failed nomination of Professor Lani Guinier to the post of Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights provides another example of the "us-versus-them" climate that commonly attends such
questions. Again the term "quota" was employed with explosive results. An editorial column in the Wall
Street Journal titled "Clinton's Quota Queens" stated that Professor Guinier "sets the standard for
innovative radicalism" and "calls for racial quotas in judicial appointments." Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota
Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12. As Mari Matsuda has observed, the term "quota queen," like
President Reagan's term "welfare queen," exploits racial stereotypes for the purpose of "substituting
kneejerk prejudice for critical thought." Mari Matsuda, Washington Runs Scared from a Quality Thinker,
NEWSDAY, June 8, 1993, at 95.
Conservative interest groups viewed the Guinier nomination as an opportunity to capitalize on the
issues of quotas and affirmative action. Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Urge Withdrawal of Rights
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at Al, A17. In the face of mounting opposition, President Clinton
withdrew Guinier's nomination, noting that "this battle unfortunately has already polarized our country"
and that continuing to pursue her confirmation would "guarantee a bloody and divisive conflict over civil
rights, based on ideas that I, as President, could not defend." The White House, President Clinton's
Announcement About the Lani Guinier Nomination, FED. NEWS SERV., June 3, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Transcript File. Voters were indeed polarized and, as with the debate over the Civil Rights
Act, the split was largely along racial lines. A USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll taken after the withdrawal of
Guinier's nomination revealed that 55% of blacks disapproved of Clinton's decision to withdraw her
nomination, compared with 31% of whites. Bill Nichols, For Some Blacks, Guinier Case Part of a Pattern,
USA TODAY, June 8, 1993, at 6A; Catherine Crier & Bernard Shaw, Polls Show Guinier Withdrawal Hurt
Clinton (CNN television broadcast, June 7, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File,
Transcript # 347-2.
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powerful interest groups presumes that there is a "right answer"--some
intention on the part of Congress that the Act be applied retroactively or
prospectively. But if the legislative history clarifies anything, it is that the
enacting legislature harbored no such intention. Thus, the process-based theory
cannot be justified by saying that the Court should "err" on the side of
protecting minority interests. In the absence of congressional intent, there can
be no "right answer" and, consequently, no "error" for Congress to correct.
This objection bears a resemblance to criticisms that have been made of
the Carolene ProductslEly school of judicial review. In criticizing process-
based theories generally, Laurence Tribe observes that "[d]eciding what kind
of participation the Constitution demands requires analysis ... of the character
and importance of the interest at stake."'5 5 As Calabresi puts it, one cannot
determine what type of legislative process is constitutionally permissible
"without an underlying substantive theory of rights."' 56 In the case of
statutory interpretation, a process-based view, it would seem, requires that the
legislative rule in question contain some discernable assignment of rights.
It is true that the text of the statute and the legislative history demonstrate
no clear intention on the part of the enacting legislature. The "correct"
interpretation, then, cannot be the actual intention of the enacting legislature.
Under these circumstances, courts should ask what rule the legislature would
have chosen in the absence of racial polarization. The test proposed here seeks
to replicate the outcome that would have emerged, if not for the distorting "us-
versus-them" climate that characterized consideration of the Act. 157
Under this test, minority interests should be given the benefit of the doubt
when the statutory language and legislative intent are ambiguous. As a result
of lingering racial prejudice, minority groups are, as a general rule,
disadvantaged vis-A-vis majority groups. The climate surrounding the 1991
Act's passage exemplifies the type of difficulties that such groups can
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157. A substantive view of democracy undergirds the approach to statutory ambiguity suggested here.
By construing ambiguous statutes to the benefit of the group disadvantaged by racial prejudice, the
presumption in favor of minority interests attempts to replicate the outcome that would emerge from a
process not infected by racial prejudice. One could conceivably argue that, rather than replicating the
outcome that would have emerged in the absence of racial prejudice, courts should attempt to determine
what the legislature would have done had it been forced to come to a decision. Alternatively, courts could
attempt to determine what the current legislature would do if forced to make the choice. Were courts to
choose either of these approaches to interpretation, they might hold that the Act should not apply
retroactively. Indeed, the racial polarization evident in the debate might be taken to indicate that, were
Congress forced to make a decision on retroactivity, it would satisfy the preferences of the most powerful
groups. This Note rejects the view that the Court should attempt to determine what the actual legislature
(either past or present) would do if forced to decide. Such an approach is not only indeterminate, but also
unfair. Only by resolving ambiguity in favor of the minority interests can courts hope to correct for the
corrosive effects of racial prejudice.
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generally expect to face in reversing judicial decisions that work to their
disadvantage. Minority groups pressing for retroactivity would have been in a
stronger bargaining position, relative to the employers' lobby, if not for the
strong racial animosity evident during the 1990 and 1991 debates.
Under these circumstances, the Court should adopt an interpretive
presumption in favor of minority interests when interpreting ambiguous
provisions. The effect of this mode of analysis is to place the burden of clarity
upon the majority. If Congress wishes to adopt a statutory rule that works to
the disadvantage of minorities, it must do so unambiguously. In the absence
of a specific statement to the contrary, courts should presume that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is to apply to all cases pending at the time of enactment.
Only by adopting such an interpretive presumption may the Court compensate
for the effects of racial prejudice upon the legislative process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Antidiscrimination law presents special problems to which courts must be
attuned when interpreting ambiguous statutes. The relevant legal principles are
likely to appear very different depending on the individual judge's perspective.
For this reason, courts must consider the greater difficulty that racial minorities
are likely to face in protecting themselves through the legislative process,
particularly when they try to overcome restrictive judicial interpretations.
Courts should be wary of adopting interpretations that disadvantage or fail to
protect minorities, without a clear legislative mandate to do so.
The Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 present salient examples of the
continuing relevance of the Carolene Products presumptions. When
inflammatory issues like employment discrimination and affirmative action are
at stake, the American public still tends to view the world in "us-versus-them"
terms. The racial animus faced by minority groups will often be less visible
than it was during consideration of the 1991 Act. Even where racial
polarization is less conspicuous, courts should take into account the relatively
greater difficulty that minority groups will generally experience in revising
statutory interpretations that disadvantage them.
The uphill battle faced by proponents of the 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights
Act should serve as a reminder of the persistence of racial prejudice in the
legislative forum. As long as such attitudes exist, courts must take into account
their distorting effect on the democratic process. Where Congress has failed to
speak clearly, courts should interpret statutes to the benefit of minority groups.
In light of these considerations, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be given
retroactive application.
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